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RELIGIOUS CLUBS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: WHAT
HAPPENED AFTER MERGENS?
Dena S. Davis*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Equal Access Act,' upheld by the Supreme Court in Board of
Education v. Mergens,2 requires public secondary schools to allow
access to religiously based student groups on the same basis as
other student clubs.' Mergens presents many challenges to civil
libertarians, who may find their traditional sympathies aligned on
both sides of the issue. This article seeks to throw light on some of
those issues by reporting on a research project that ascertained the
actual effect of the Act on public high schools in Ohio.
5
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Widmar v. Vincent,6 the Supreme Court held that a public
university in the State of Missouri was required to allow religiously
based student groups the same access to school facilities as it
afforded to other student groups.7 If a public university adopts a
* Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University. J.D.,
University of Virginia, 1990; Ph.D. (Religion), University of Iowa, 1986.
20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1994).
2 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (noting public secondary schools that receive federal funding and
have what is known as a "limited open forum" cannot deny access to nor discriminate against
students who wish to conduct meetings based on the religious content of the speech at such
meetings).
See infra Part III (outlining the tension between the need for freedom of speech and the
"coercive environment" of public secondary schools that could lead to undue pressure on
students to accept religious doctrine).
' See infra Part IV (discussing data from "The Mergens Project," a telephone survey of
Ohio's public high school districts seeking information on religiously based student clubs and
organizations).
6 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
7 See id. at 277. In Widinar, students from a registered religious group called Cornerstone
sued the university after the group was told they could no longer use the university buildings
to conduct meetings. Id. at 265. The university had adopted a policy that prohibited the use
of any university buildings 'for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching."' Id. at
265.
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policy of accommodating various student groups' meetings, as was
the case in Widmar, the university has created what is known as
an "open" or "public" forum.9  In other words, if the student
democrats and the student chess club were allowed certain access
and privileges, a student religious club could not be excluded.'° The
decision was grounded primarily on the right of free speech, with
the Court viewing the exclusion of religious clubs as "content-based
discrimination.""
The university argued that allowing religious groups to meet for
worship in state university buildings was a violation of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Using the three-
pronged Lemon test," the Court found the university's "open-forum
policy" did not discriminate against religious speech, as the policy
had a secular purpose, avoided entanglement of government with
religion, and did not have the "'primary effect' of advancing
religion."'4 In addressing the university's concerns on the issue of
"advancement," the Court pointed to the rich diversity of clubs and
interest groups already on campus, many of whose goals were not
See id. (noting the university "officially recognize[d] over 100 student groups").
See id. at 267 (noting because the university created an open forum, the university
"assumed an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable
constitutional norms").
,0 See id. at 267-68. "The Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a
forum generally open to the public, even if it was not required to create the forum in the first
place." Id.
" Id. at 276.
Having created a forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks to enforce
a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary policy violates the
fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and
the University is unable to justify this violation under applicable constitutional
standards.
Id. at 277.
12 Id. at 270-71.
, See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Government policies and statutes do not
offend the Establishment Clause if such policies and/or statutes meet the three prongs of the
Lemon test. See id. at 612-13. The Lemon test's three prongs are: first, the policy must have
a secular legislative purpose; second, the policy must have a principal or primary effect that
neither inhibits nor advances religion; and, third, the policy may not "foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion."' Id. (citation omitted). Although having no direct
effect on the legal discussion of this article, it should be noted, "[i]n 1997, the Supreme Court
appeared to consider the 'entanglement' prong as an effect, thus reducing the Lemon test to
two central inquiries: secular purpose and secular effect." So Chun, Comment, A Decade
After Smith: An Examination of the New York Court of Appeals' Stance on the Free Exercise of
Religion in Relation to Minnesota, Washington, and California, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1305, 1322-23
n.149 (2000) (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223-24, 232-33 (1997)).
"4 Widinar, 454 U.S. at 271-75.
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endorsed by the university. 5  The Court noted "[u]niversity
students are... young adults. They are less impressionable than
younger students and should be able to appreciate that the
University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion."'16 Thus,
there was little danger that students would perceive the university,
or the State of Missouri, as giving religion special encouragement or
endorsement that amounted to either an impermissible privilege or
resulted in a significant advancement of religion's interests.
7
Subsequently, some federal courts failed to extend the reasoning
of Widmar to public secondary schools. Some federal courts
departed from Widmar in the "open forum" analysis,'8 while others
departed from the "advancement" analysis.' 9 For example, in
Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School
District,20 the Fifth Circuit held that a secondary school is not a
"public forum," even if the school allows many student groups to
meet before or after school.21 In Lubbock, the court stated: "[t]he
District also argues that the school is a public forum, relying on
Widmar .... maintaining that it created a public forum when it
allowed many student groups to meet before or after school. This
reliance is misplaced. 22  The Lubbock court instead relied on the
decision in Brandon v. Board of Education,23 decided by the Second
Circuit a year before Widmar.24 In Brandon, the Second Circuit
explicitly held "a high school is not a 'public forum' where religious
views can be freely aired."25  Other federal courts departed from
Widmar in the advancement analysis; for example, in Bender v.
Williamsport Area School District,26 the Third Circuit noted high
school students are less mature and more impressionable than
15 See id. at 274 (stating the use of university facilities by the Students for a Democratic
Society and the Young Socialist Alliance did not necessarily commit the university to the
goals of these organizations).
'6 Id. at 274 n.14.
7 Id. at 274-75. "If the Establishment Clause barred the extension of general benefits to
religious groups, 'a church could not be protected by the police and fire departments, or have
its public sidewalk kept in repair."' Id. (citations omitted).
8 See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text (discussing, as an example, Lubbock Civil
Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982)).
" See infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (discussing, as an example, Bender v.
Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980)).
20 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982).
2 Id. at 1048.
22 Id.
23 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980).
2 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
25 Brandon, 635 F.2d at 980.
26 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated, 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (vacating on jurisdictional
grounds without deciding the merits of the case).
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university students, and, thus, were "less able to appreciate the fact
that permission for [the religious club] to meet would be granted out
of a spirit of neutrality toward religion and not advancement.
27
The court concluded: "the possible perception by adolescent
students that government is communicating a message of
endorsement of religion if it permitted a religious group to meet
would be vastly different in a high school setting than the
perception of such action by college students in a college setting.
2
Congress reacted to the confusion created by the federal courts'
failure to extend Widmar to secondary public schools29 by passing
the Equal Access Act.30 The Act prohibits all secondary schools that
receive federal funding, and that have a "limited open forum," from
discriminating against student groups on the basis of their
"religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at
such meetings. '31  A "limited open forum" exists when the school
provides opportunities for noncurriculum-related student groups to
meet on school premises outside of class hours. 32 Therefore, if a
school allows a chess club, a science fiction club, or a Young
Homemakers of America club, it must also allow a Christian club or
a Jewish club (or, of course, a Hare Krishna club) as well.
33
27 Id. at 552. The court also noted high school students are under the guise of compulsory
attendance laws, while university students are not. Id. For another example of a federal
court failing to extend the reasoning of Widmar to secondary schools, see Nartowicz v. Clayton
County School District, 736 F.2d 646, 648-50 (11th Cir. 1984). In Nartowicz, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction that prohibited the
school district from allowing student religious groups to meet on school property, since
allowing a Youth for Christ group to meet on school grounds may not have furthered a secular
purpose and may have presented entanglement problems, possibly violating the first and
third prongs of the Lemon test. Id.
28 Bender, 741 F.2d at 552.
29 See S. REP. No. 98-357, at 6-7 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2352-53.
Despite Widnmar, many school administrators across the country are prohibiting
voluntary, student-initiated religious speech as an extracurricular activity. Like the
judges of the district court in Widinar, they erroneously believe that the Establishment
Clause prohibits students from engaging in such speech at all, even when other types of
extracurricular student speech are permitted .... A primary source of their confusion has
been the lower Federal courts.
Id. at 2352.
The Senate, in committee hearings on the Equal Access Act, pointed to the Lubbock decision
as a case that has brought confusion to the arena of religious free speech for public school
students. See id. at 2353. "Students from California, Texas, Pennsylvania, Minnesota,
Georgia, and Washington testified that a large number of school administrators are confused
by the Lubbock and Brandon cases, which appear to be inconsistent with Supreme Court
decisions recognizing that students have rights of free speech and association." Id. at 2357.
o 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1994).
3' 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a).
3 20 U.S.C. § 4072(b).
3' Equal access protects non-religious groups as well, including those whose activities
might be squelched on the basis of their "political" or "philosophical" content. See Bd. of Educ.
HeinOnline  -- 64 Alb. L. Rev. 228 2000-2001
2000] Religious Clubs in Public Schools
In Board of Education v. Mergens,3 4 the Supreme Court ruled that
the Equal Access Act was constitutional and did not violate the
Establishment Clause.35 Although the bulk of the decision focused
on the meaning of a "limited open forum," the Court did address the
constitutional issues as well.3 6 The plurality stated that neither the
difference in age and maturity of high school versus college age
v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990) (noting "the Act on its face grants equal access to both
secular and religious speech"). Thus, a school district in Utah reacted to plans by gay and
lesbian students to form a high school club and support group by closing down all its student
clubs, an unpopular move among students. See James Brooke, To Be Young, Gay and Going
to High School in Utah, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1996, at B8. Ironically, the sponsor of the Equal
Access Act, Senator Orrin G. Hatch of Utah, was among the most vociferous in arguing
against the gay and lesbian club. "'The act was never intended to promulgate immoral speech
or activity,' he said." Id.
Subsequently, the East High Gay/Straight Alliance, along with several students, brought
an action against the Board of Education of the Salt Lake City School District, seeking
preliminary injunctive relief to prevent the school board from denying them "access to the
'limited open forum' that the defendants allegedly [had] created for 'non-curricular' student
clubs at East High School." E. High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 30 F. Supp. 2d
1356, 1357 (D. Utah 1998). The court denied the injunction because, based on the evidence
submitted, the court could not determine if a "limited open forum" existed. Id. at 1364. In a
later proceeding, the court partially granted the Alliance's summary judgment motion by
finding that during the 1997-1998 school year East High School had a "limited open forum,"
but, otherwise denied the motion. See E. High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 81 F.
Supp. 2d 1166, 1184, 1195 (D. Utah 1999). Ruling in favor of the school board, the court
noted "the District has adopted and maintained a closed forum under the Equal Access Act
and that a 'limited open forum' as defined by the Act does not now exist at ... East High." Id.
at 1197-98 (emphasis added). Subsequently, another group formed at East High, the PRISM
Club, and applied for group status under the District's procedures for clubs in a "limited
closed forum." See E. High Sch. PRISM Club v. Seidel, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1240, 1242 (D.
Utah 2000). The District denied the Club's application, and the Club brought suit seeking a
preliminary injunction in federal district court. Id. at 1240. The District's policy was to
"provide[ ] for sponsorship of Student Clubs that are directly related to the curriculum offered
in the school at which the Club is organized."' Id. at 1242. The court ultimately granted the
injunction because the proposed club related to classes offered within East High's curriculum,
and the court found the District had inconsistently applied its own standards in evaluating
the club's application. See id. at 1245, 1247, 1251. The school district argued that by
allowing the club, the forum would now be considered "open." See id. at 1251. However, the
court disagreed and noted "[t]he only potential damage to Defendant is that an injunction will
require the District to consistently apply the standard it itself established to limit access to its
forum." Id.
34 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
" Id. at 253.
16 See id. at 247-53 (applying the same logic as in Widmar, the Court found the Act did not
violate the Establishment Clause through the application of the Lemon test). The Court
noted the "equal access" feature of the Act gave it the "purpose ... to [neither] 'endorse or
disapprove of religion."' Id. at 249 (citations omitted). Furthermore, the Court found the
speech in question was not "government speech endorsing religion," but, rather, "private
speech endorsing religion," which is protected by the Free Speech and Exercise Clauses. Id.
at 250. The Court also found the Act limited school officials' participation so as to eliminate
any worry of coercion by school officials, and noted "denial of equal access to religious speech
might well create greater entanglement problems" than the simple assignment of a school
employee for supervisory purposes as required in the Act. Id. at 251-53.
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students, nor the state's compulsory attendance laws, required a
different result in Mergens than in Widmar.3
To be sure, the possibility of student peer pressure remains,
but there is little if any risk of official state endorsement or
coercion where no formal classroom activities are involved
and no school officials actively participate .... To the extent
a school makes clear that its recognition of respondents'
proposed club is not an endorsement of the views of the club's
participants,... students will reasonably understand that
the school's official recognition of the club evinces neutrality
toward, rather than endorsement of, religious speech.1
8
The plurality also dismissed concerns about faculty sponsors and
other accoutrements of secondary school life,39 relying on the
language of the Act itself to curtail excessive "entanglement"
between government and religion.4 °
III. DISCUSSION
The issue raised in Mergens is an extremely difficult one for civil
libertarians. On the one hand, it is patently wrong, not to mention
unconstitutional, to allow public schools to exclude certain groups
merely because of their beliefs.4' The message thus given to
students-whether it is one of hostility toward religion or contempt
for the requirements of free expression-is certainly not one we
wish to promote. Further, it is condescending and destructive to
assume that students cannot have sincere political or religious
views that command protection from school censorship. In 1969,
civil libertarians rejoiced when the Court decided that high school
students had the right to symbolic speech that expressed their
" See id. at 250-51 (giving deference to Congress's opinion that high school students can
distinguish between school sponsored speech and student-initiated speech). The Court did
not "second-guess" Congress's judgment, which was "based in part on empirical
determinations." Id.
38 Id. at 251 (citation omitted).
39 See id. at 252-53 (stating a faculty sponsor does not raise entanglement issues, as the
Act prohibits a sponsor's direct participation in any religious meeting).
" For example, the Act limits the participation by school officials at meetings of religious
groups. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (c)(3). The Act states: "employees or agents of the school or
government are [only allowed to be] present at religious meetings ... in a nonparticipatory
capacity." Id.
41 See, e.g., E. High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1170 (D.
Utah 1999) (noting although a board of education can set a "forum," once set, "it may not pick
and choose among the ideas or viewpoints that find expression in that forum" because "[t]he
Constitution commands otherwise").
[Vol. 64
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opposition to the Vietnam War. 2 As Douglas Laycock asks, "[h]ow
can it be that students are mature enough to deal with war protests
and refusals to salute the flag-in the presence of an entire class-
but are not mature enough to deal with a secluded prayer meeting
attended only by those who wish to attend?"
43
On the other hand, it would be disingenuous to ignore the
pervasively coercive environment of a public secondary school,
which is strikingly unlike that of a public university.
Extracurricular clubs are part of the school experience and students
are encouraged to participate. Faculty "sponsors" or "monitors" are
usually required in high school clubs. In some schools,
extracurricular activities may substitute for curricular
requirements. Club meetings may be announced over the Public
Address system by school leaders. Laycock's comments that
separationists have been "led into error" about equal access because
of their "hostility to the set of political and religious views that they
associate with the supporters of school prayer '"44 are naive in view of
his own comment that the religious right generally "denies that the
establishment clause requires neutrality. '45 The "give 'em an inch
and they'll take a mile" attitude that separationists have toward the
religious right is not without reason.
In fact, the concurrence by Justice Marshall (joined by Justice
Brennan) in Mergens emphasizes the differences between Westside
High and the University of Missouri, and delineates a number of
steps that Westside must take in order to "avoid appearing to
sponsor or endorse the [religious] club's goals. 46  Marshall notes
that the important difference is not that university and high school
students have different levels of sophistication and varying abilities
"to perceive the subtle differences between toleration and
endorsement, 47 but that the institutions themselves differ in how
42 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
[The students] wore [black armbands] to exhibit their disapproval of the Vietnam
hostilities and their advocacy of a truce, to make their views known, and, by their
example, to influence others to adopt them. They neither interrupted school activities
nor sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of others. They caused discussion
outside of the classrooms, but no interference with work and no disorder. In the
circumstances, our Constitution does not permit officials of the State to deny their form
of expression.
Id.
4 Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious
Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (1986).
14 Id. at 9.
' Id. at 6-7.
Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 270 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 267 (Marshall, J., concurring).
2000]
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they define their relationship to student groups. 48 The university
seems to take a neutral attitude toward these clubs, whereas
Westside urges students to get involved in extracurricular activities,
and "regards its student clubs as a mechanism for defining and
transmitting fundamental values. '49 Thus, Marshall believes that
"Westside must redefine its relationship to [the] club program."50
Another issue raised in the concurrence is the lack at Westside of
a "truly robust forum that includes the participation of more than
one advocacy-oriented group."'" Whereas the university's clubs
included a wide spectrum of political opinion, such that no student
could seriously believe that the university was endorsing all the
clubs, Westside's clubs certainly merited Justice Stevens's barb that
they were as controversial as a "grilled cheese sandwich. 52 In a list
of Westside's clubs, which included four different cheerleading
clubs, a panoply of athletic activities, three community service
clubs, and various career oriented groups,53 the proposed Christian
club stuck out like a sore thumb (or like a cross on a hilltop).
An appealing argument to civil libertarians is that equal access
would allow a whole carnival of religious and political clubs from
which students could freely choose. At least, where religion is
concerned, this may prove to be a chimera. A more likely
consequence is that Jews, who are traditionally separationists,54
would shun such activity, groups labeled as "cults" would stay away
for fear of possible legal repercussions of adherents who are
minors,55 Catholics would either be in parochial schools or focus
41 See id. at 267-68 (Marshall, J., concurring) (postulating that high schools' de-emphasis of
student autonomy indicates that high school administrators perceive a lower level of maturity
in high school students and structure extracurricular activities accordingly).
49 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring). As the majority took note, Westside's school board policy
concerning clubs describes them "as a 'vital part of the total education program as a means of
developing citizenship, wholesome attitudes, good human relations, knowledge and skills."'
Id. at 231.
'o Id. at 269 (Marshall, J., concurring).
"' Id. at 268 (Marshall, J., concurring). It is clearly not inappropriate to describe Mergens'
club as "advocacy-oriented," as more than one student stated that she joined the club at least
in part to evangelize other students. See Petitioners' Brief at 12 n.7, Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226 (1990) (No. 88-1597); J.A. at 185, Mergens 496 U.S. 226 (No. 88-1597) (quoting
the student who initiated the lawsuit, as saying she wanted to be in the Club because some of
the nonreligious students might "like to become Christians and follow God").
32 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 276 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" See id. app. at 253-58 (giving a list of student activities, including Band, Chess Club,
Choir, Speech and Debate, Future Medical Assistants, Latin Club, Math Club, Creative
Writing Club, Swimming Timing Team, and the Wrestling Auxiliary).
"' See generally STEVEN M. COHEN, THE DIMENSIONS OF AMERICAN JEWISH LIBERALISM 3
(1989) (stating that Jews "favor strict separation" between church and state).
" For example, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness was nearly
bankrupted by litigation that lasted approximately three years when the group was sued by
[Vol. 64
HeinOnline  -- 64 Alb. L. Rev. 232 2000-2001
2000] Religious Clubs in Public Schools 233
their after school activities on their churches, and the field would be
left to Evangelical Protestants. Among the pallid fare that
constitutes the usual extracurricular menu for high school students
a single Christian prayer club becomes intensely problematic.
Laycock identifies two kinds of "foreseeable" abuse of the Equal
Access Act: school sponsorship of religious groups and school
exclusion of unpopular groups; he explains why neither abuse is
likely.5 6 But what is more likely is simply that, by the schools doing
nothing, the sole existence of a single Christian group will act to
engender the appearance of sponsorship. As Justice Marshall said
in his concurrence, "in the absence of a truly robust forum that
includes the participation of more than one advocacy-oriented
group, the presence of a religious club could provide a fertile ground
for peer pressure, especially if the club commanded support from a
substantial portion of the student body." Thus, the civil
libertarian committed to the Establishment Clause fears that the
secondary school environment will work to provide at least an
appearance of endorsement, if not frank coercion, if religious groups
are allowed "equal access."
So, which is it? Is the Equal Access Act a clever "artifice" to
"circumvent" the Supreme Court's previous decisions striking down
organized school prayer?58 Will students "be influenced to adopt the
school endorsed prayer club's beliefs to meet what they perceive to
be the school's expectations"? 9 Will these clubs be "fronts" for
evangelizing activity organized primarily by adults, or provide
the mother of a girl who ran away from home to join the group when she was fifteen. See
George v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 262 Cal. Rptr. 217, 223 (Ct. App. 4th Dist.
1989), reh'g denied, 1989 Cal. App. LEXIS 996 (Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1989); stay granted 494 U.S.
1075 (1990), motion granted, 495 U.S. 928 (1990), vacated, remanded, 499 U.S. 914 (1991),
review denied, opinion withdrawn, 1989 Cal. LEXIS 5077 (Cal. Nov. 30, 1989), stay granted,
1990 U.S. LEXIS 1768 (U.S. Apr. 2, 1990), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930 (1990), reaffirmed in
part, remanded, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 473 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1992), rehearing denied, 1992 Cal.
App. LEXIS 253 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. Mar. 3, 1992), review denied, opinion withdrawn, 1992
Cal. LEXIS 2267 (Cal. Apr. 29, 1992); see also Alan Abrahamson, Krishnas Did Not
Brainwash Cypress Girl, Court Rules, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1989, at Metro 2 (noting the
original "$9.7 million award would have forced the Krishnas to sell six temples - in San Diego,
Los Angeles, Laguna Beach, Brooklyn, New Orleans, and outside New Orleans").
56 See Laycock, supra note 43, at 53-55 (concluding the religious right will not want to
jeopardize informal prayer groups by requesting a school's official sponsorship, and schools
cannot have an open policy only to exclude groups of which the school disapproves).
" Mergens, 496 U.S. at 268 (Marshall, J., concurring).
58 See Brief of Amici Curiae Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'rith et al. at 6, 8, Bd. of
Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (No. 88-1597) (citing Senator Hatfield, a leading
proponent of the Act, who "essentially conceded" that "equal access" was a device used to
circumvent establishment clause impediments to promoting religion in public schools).
s9 Id. at 15.
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"backdoor access for organized prayer to enter public schools"?6°
Will the club's faculty supervisor tend to be the popular basketball
coach, and will there be a nexus between sports, Christianity, and
popularity that appears to have school endorsement? Will "the
preferences of individuals in a religious minority ... be inundated
by a torrent of allegedly voluntary observances," as a New York
Times editorial predicted?61 Ought civil libertarians seek to curtail
the implications of Mergens, or ought we to go the next step and
endorse the equal access concept even in elementary schools, as one
set of proposed guidelines suggests?
62
Will "a thousand flowers bloom, 63 and school clubs grow to
include a variety of religions and political perspectives, so that the
"grilled cheese sandwich, 64 at least acquires a touch of mustard and
a side of salsa? Will religious clubs, with the Equal Access Act
protecting "voluntary forms of religious speech in the face of
potentially hostile school officials," 65 be one more "take it or leave it"
offering? Or, will the religious club stand alone as the sole advocacy
organization, but without engendering significant peer pressure or
other Establishment Clause concerns?
How will Mergens affect the community in which the school is
embedded? Are school officials who believe "that allowing religious
speech ... is more trouble than it is worth, '66 correct? After
Mergens, a number of school districts went to considerable trouble
attempting to avoid complying with the Equal Access Act. For
example, one school district redefined "noncurriculum related" to
6 Leah Gallant Morgenstein, Note, Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v.
Mergens: Three "R's" + Religion = Mergens, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 222 (1991).
61 Editorial, School Prayer Anxieties, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1995, at A22.
62 See Jay Alan Sekulow et al., Proposed Guidelines for Student Religious Speech and
Observance in Public Schools, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1017, app. at 1091-95 (1995) (defining
"persons affected" by the proposed guidelines as "[a]ny student enrolled in a public
elementary, middle, or secondary school"); see also Laycock, supra note 43, at 51 (noting the
Equal Access Act "arguably" applies to junior high schools and perhaps to elementary
students and this issue "must be addressed under the Constitution"). The Equal Access Act,
as originally drafted, would have encompassed elementary school students. See S. REP. No.
98-357, at 38 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2384.
63 Generally attributed to Mao Tse-Tung. See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MODERN
QUOTATIONS 146 (Tony Augarde ed., 1991) (attributing the quotation "[lietting a hundred
flowers blossom" to Mao Tse-Tung in a speech given by Mao in Peking on February 27, 1957).
64 See B. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 276 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining
that a school's recognition of non-controversial clubs does not demonstrate that the school
believes its students are better off if permitted or encouraged to "compete along ideological
lines").
65 Frank R. Jimenez, Note, Beyond Mergens: Ensuring Equality of Student Religious
Speech Under the Equal Access Act, 100 YALE L. J. 2149, 2150 (1991).
6 Sekulow et al., supra note 62, at 1018.
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refer only to student-initiated groups.67 The court struck down this
attempt.
68
After Mergens, religious groups have shown a continued interest
in expanding their access to public school environments. In
Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of University of Virginia,69 the
Court ruled that a public university must pay for the printing of a
religiously based publication put out by a school group, on the same
basis as it funds other publications.7 ° Justice Souter dissented,
labeling the publication as "frankly evangelistic."'" The Supreme
Court recently held that student-led organized prayer prior to high
school football games is public, not private speech, and, thus,
violates the Establishment Clause.72 Similarly, invocations and
benedictions at graduation ceremonies may also violate the
Establishment Clause.73 Pressure for a so-called "religious liberty
amendment" to the Constitution continues. 7 4  Thus, the questions
67 See Pope v. E. Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12 F.3d 1244, 12,18-49 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting the
school attempted to circumvent the Act by adopting a policy requiring all student based
groups be sponsored by the school board rather than initiated by the students).
6 See id. at 1248-51 (enjoining the school from 'interfering with the rights granted [to
students] by the Equal Access Act to form a voluntary student Bible Club'). The court
concluded "student initiation of clubs and other groups is not a requirement for triggering the
Equal Access Act." Id. at 1251.
69 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
o See id. at 845-46 (holding "[t]he neutrality commanded of the State by the separate
Clauses of the First Amendment was compromised by the University's course of action" and
those actions risked "fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion").
" See id. at 877 (Souter, J., dissenting) (chastising the majority for not seeing the true
nature of the student publication). Souter also stated, "[t]he resulting decision is in
unmistakable tension with the accepted law that the Court continues to avow." Id. at 865.
72 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266, 2275 (2000) (holding that
"'student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment Clause').
The Court distinguished the holding in Santa Fe with that of Mergens. Id. In Mergens, the
Court held the speech to be private, and, thus, protected under the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clause. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990). In Santa Fe, the
Court was "not persuaded that the pregame invocations should be regarded as 'private
speech."' Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2275. Therefore, because the Court found the speech in
Santa Fe to be public, the government's endorsement of the speech violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution. See id.
7 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (holding a school principal inviting
members of the clergy to give invocations and benedictions at graduations violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment); Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F.
Supp. 1097, 1102 (E.D.Va. 1993) (holding "permitting prayer in a state or School Board
sponsored high school graduation is a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment"). See generally Stephen B. Pershing, Graduation Prayer After Lee v. Weisman:
A Cautionary Tale, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1097, 1114, 1120 (1995) (discussing the background of
Gearon in the context of the argument that "[i]t is not prayer, but the government's
involvement in prayer, that offends the Constitution").
71 See generally John DiConsiglio, Constitutional Crisis?, 130 SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, Sept. 8,
1997, available at 1997 WL 9585628 (noting although supporters may push for the
amendment, getting any amendment passed, especially a controversial one, is nearly
impossible).
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that animated Mergens remain important. If we are to have a
reasoned perspective on those issues, we need to know answers to
some empirical questions, among them: how many religious clubs
were formed in public schools in response to Mergens? Did those
clubs exhibit a wide variety of religious faiths? Did any schools
close down their "limited public fora"7 5 rather than allow religious
clubs?
IV. THE MERGENS PROJECT
In an attempt to answer as many of these questions as possible, in
1995, I undertook a survey of all public high school districts in
Ohio.7 6 Unfortunately, a limited budget precluded a survey of the
entire nation. However, Ohio, because it ranges geographically and
culturally from Cleveland to Appalachia, is a good choice if one is
forced to limit oneself to a single state.
With the help of Robert Sheehan of the Center for Applied
Research in Education at Cleveland State University, I determined
that a random telephone sampling of 241 school districts would
constitute a statistically sound result. Dr. Sheehan and I created a
telephone interview instrument consisting of twenty-one questions
to be asked of high school principals (or other administrators if the
principals were not available). I report the significant findings
below.
Of the institutions surveyed, at that time ninety-three had
religious based clubs or organizations for high school students that
met on the school premises; 148 did not. The 148 districts reported
having taken no steps to either encourage or discourage such clubs.
Only one of the districts removed itself from the reach of the Equal
Access Act by limiting existing clubs only to those that were
curriculum -related.
Of the districts that had religious clubs, all were Christian; some
were described as "non-denominational," some as "Protestant," and
some as "mixed." The number of students participating ranged from
under five at two schools to nearly a hundred at three schools.
Although only about half the districts required faculty advisors,
all but fifteen of the districts that had clubs had advisors. 7 Only
" Mergens, 496 U.S. at 291 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76 Original research data on file with the author at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
, In my opinion, the school advisor issue has been inadequately addressed in the Act, in
Mergens, and in most of the articles on this topic. The Act says that "employees or agents of
the school or government [may be] present at religious meetings only in a nonparticipatory
capacity." 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(3) (1994). This distinguishes the role of adult "onlookers," (for
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three districts allowed club activity to be used for independent-
study credit.
Club activities were announced to students in a variety of ways,
including bulletin boards, over the Public Address system (the most
popular), flyers, and word of mouth. In some schools, the clubs had
generated other school-based activities, including a glee club,
speakers and assemblies, dances, trips, and a blood drive. Most
respondents did not report any source of funding, but those who did
included membership dues (nine schools), district funds (two
schools), and contributions from the community, various churches,
and fundraisers (six in all).
I was especially interested in how these groups got started.
People who applaud the Equal Access Act tend to characterize the
clubs as the spontaneous result of student interest. Those who
oppose it often see it as a plot by outside evangelical ministries to
establish beachheads in public schools.78  Of the schools that had
religious clubs, thirty-two did not know how their groups formed,
and thirty reported that students initiated the group. Sixteen
schools reported clubs started by faculty members, seven by
ministers, four by athletic coaches, and one by the Parent Teachers
Organization.7 9  One respondent reported that students "were
disgusted with the situation in the world and approached the
principal." One principal reported that "two coaches thought the
clubs would be a positive thing for students ... but the main reason
the clubs were started was to keep the kids away from drugs."
When asked whether the school had taken steps to encourage or
discourage such clubs, fifteen respondents answered that the clubs
were encouraged; the others appeared to be neutral.
lack of a better word) from the role they play in such clubs as French, Boy and Girl Scouts,
Pep Squad, etc. If we assume that teachers, who volunteer to be present at these clubs, are
somewhat sympathetic to their aims, and knowing that the natural and common role of
teachers in clubs involves some sort of support and leadership, it is difficult to imagine that
the onlookers confine their roles to making sure that students don't break the furniture.
7 See James J. Knicely, Free Speech and Nonestablishment in the Public Schools, 22 J.L.
& EDUC. 73, 74 (1993). But,
[t]he origins of the Equal Access Act were not in a 'conservative' master agenda or some
conspiracy hatched in the Reagan-Bush White House, but in the spontaneously simple,
yet persuasive, complaints of individual students who were prohibited by school
administrators from praying or discussing religious subjects on school property, while
their counterparts were permitted to meet and use school property for a variety of self-
directed speech purposes.
Id.
79 This finding is problematic, as the Act says the meeting must be "student-initiated," and
school employees must be present "only in a nonparticipatory capacity." 20 U.S.C. §
4071(c)(1), (3) (1994). The Act also says "nonschool persons may not direct, conduct, control,
or regularly attend activities of student groups." § 4071(c)(5).
200]
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Only a minority of schools (eleven in all) reported controversy. In
one school, a "strong" faculty member, who was also a head coach,
had initiated and supported the club (Fellowship of Christian
Athletes). As a result, some parents and students believed that
"you had to be involved in the club to play football." Students who
didn't join reported harassment and eventually complained to the
school board. As a result, the school became a "closed forum." Five
schools reported controversy from the staff, three from parents, and
one each from students, the school board, and the community.
V. CONCLUSION
At least in Ohio, the news on Mergens is mixed. On the one hand,
the Court's decision that the Equal Access Act is constitutional did
not trigger a tidal wave of religious evangelizing in public schools.
Nor did it result in an upsurge of sectarian controversy or public
conflict. (Since the ACLU is active and visible in Ohio, I am
reasonably certain that the lack of controversy does not simply
mean that people, who feel their rights have been trampled by
religiously based school clubs, are suffering in silence.) As expected,
Christian clubs, usually of a Protestant nature, are the sole
advocacy offerings in virtually all the schools in which they are
present. Thus, Justice Stevens's comment about the "grilled cheese
sandwich" continues to be apropos.8 °
More troubling are the schools in which clubs are initiated by
teachers, coaches, or outside ministers, which seems directly
contrary to the provisions of the Act.8' On the other hand, the Act's
provisions, with regard to adult participation, are both disingenuous
and probably not constitutional.82 It is disingenuous to think that,
in an environment as controlled and authoritarian as a public high
school,83 officially sanctioned student activities will involve teachers
in only neutral, nonparticipatory, custodial fashions. And it is
probably not constitutional to expect them to do so. After all, if a
teacher can initiate and support a scuba club or a cheerleading
squad, why not the bible study group? And if a Scout troop can
80 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (questioning whether high schools have
student groups that offer "a wide spectrum of political opinion").
", See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(1) (requiring "the meeting [to be] voluntary and student-
initiated").
2 See Morgenstein, supra note 60, at 261 (recommending the Equal Access Act be declared
unconstitutional since it is ambiguous, conflicts with precedent, and lacks a secular purpose).
" See Laycock, supra note 43, at 50 (reciting the argument that "a high school never can be
an open forum, because the educational function requires the school to control so much of the
speech that goes on there").
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meet in the school, with all the infrastructure, leadership and
official organization of the national scouting organizations, under
what theory can a school deny to the student bible group the
presence and leadership of a local minister?
This study was limited to one state, and to a quantitative
methodology. It would be very worthwhile to do a similar study
nationwide, and also to investigate further a representative number
of public schools to pursue questions only a qualitative study can
answer, for example, about the influence of these clubs in the
school, the actual role of advisors, and so on. It would also be
interesting to interview other students in the school, such as Jewish
or Muslim students, to find out why they have not initiated parallel
organizations.
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